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Abstract The international dialogue on responsible
governance of nanotechnologies engages a wide range
of actorswith conflicting aswell as common interests. It
is also characterised by a lack of evidence-based data on
uncertain risks of in particular engineered nanomate-
rials. The present paper aims at deepening understand-
ing of the collective decision making context at
international level using the grounded theory approach
as proposed byGlaser andStrauss in ‘‘TheDiscovery of
Grounded Theory’’ (1967). This starts by discussing
relevant concepts from different fields including so-
ciological and political studies of international relations
as well as political philosophy and ethics. This analysis
of current trends in international lawmaking is taken as
starting point for exploring the role that a software
decision support tool could play in multi-stakeholder
global governance of nanotechnologies. These theore-
tical ideas are then compared with the current design of
the SUN Decision Support System (SUNDS) under
development in the European project on Sustainable
Nanotechnologies (SUN, www.sun-fp7.eu). Through
constant comparison, the ideas are also compared with
requirements of different stakeholders as expressed
during a user workshop. This allows for highlighting
discussion points for further consideration.
Keywords Nanotechnology  International
governance  Responsible research and innovation 
Sustainability
Introduction
Observation and participation in dialogue on the
international governance of nanotechnology and other
emerging technologies since the 1990s have inspired a
search for concepts to describe the emerging gover-
nance structures as well as for setting ethically sound
targets for consolidation of these governance struc-
tures. Examples of proposed concepts include na-
noethics, responsible nanoresearch, nanosafety,
precaution, stakeholder dialogue and governance of
uncertain risks of nanomaterials. A major criticism of
these proposals and initiatives is their arbitrariness:
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What distinguishes nanotechnology so categorically
from other emerging technologies to call for nano-
specific ethical principles or governance structures? A
decade of research in nanoethics and ethical, legal and
societal aspects (ELSA) of nanotechnology and of
public and stakeholder dialogue has not resulted in a
satisfying answer to this question.
The present article therefore starts from the other
end, taking a particular theory of ethically sound global
governance as a starting point and then considering its
applicability to the case of international governance of
emerging technologies including nanotechnology in a
secondary instance. The core of the tentative theore-
tical framework is constituted by Risse’s (2002) review
of the role of transnational actors in international
governance, Rawls’ (1999) ideas on deliberative
democracy and Habermas’ (2011) discussion of Kant’s
ideal institutionalisation of ‘‘perpetual peace’’ (Kant
1795). Central research questions are as follows:
– What can theories of international relations and
deliberative democracy contribute to understand-
ing multistakeholder governance of emerging
technologies?
– What role could software decision support play in
democratising such governance?
Grounded theory based analytical approach
The present article aims to contribute to the formulation
of a substantive grounded theory [as proposed byGlaser
and Strauss (1967)] for the field of international
governance of nanotechnology through identification
of conceptual categories and their conceptual properties
and the formulation of generalised relations among the
categories and their properties in an integrated form.
Grounded theory is a good ‘‘fit’’ for this field, because
we are dealing with an relatively new set of inquiries.
Whilst the area of applied ethics has a substantial body
of theory this sub-field does not. Hence, the need to
return to primary sources to build theory up as it were.
According toGlaser andStrauss, the concepts should
be analytic—revealing characteristics of the studied
entities—and sensitising—yielding meaningful pic-
tures. The formulation of such grounded theory starts
with observation and participation in the field of study,
in this case the emerging heterogeneous community of
stakeholders interested in international governance of
nanotechnology. This paper’s authors have been en-
gaged in several research projects on the scientific,
ethical, legal and societal (ELSA) and environment,
health and safety dimensions of nanotechnology and
this experience informs the interpretive lens applied to
weave together interdisciplinary theoretical concepts
from sociology, ethics and political philosophy with
quantitative data on the international governance of
nanotechnology from a variety of sources including
interviews, workshops, field notes, literature research
and surveys. The present article introduces concepts
from established theories in international relations and
philosophy to analyse data collected from different
sources on current practices in international governance
of nanotechnology. Glaser and Strauss (1967) promote
such an introduction of theoretical concepts after the
first round of data collection in generating a new
grounded theory, provided that these concepts are
relevant and that they fit the analysed data. The present
article diverges from the conventional generation of a
grounded theory in the sense that the latter is a theory in
social sciences while the present article combines
normative philosophical with descriptive sociological
concepts in an interdisciplinary approach.
Glaser and Strauss (1967) explain that constant
comparison combines explicit coding of data with
constant redesign and reintegration of theoretical
notions while reviewing the data. The aim is to
generate a theory that is integrated, consistent, plau-
sible, close to the data and readily operationalised for
testing in quantitative research. It is not useful for
provisional testing, because the data are not extensive
enough nor coded extensively enough. The constant
comparison method consists of four stages:
(1) Comparing incidents applicable to each category;
(2) Integrating categories and their properties;
(3) Determining the theory, that should be parsi-
monious in variables and formulation and as
wide as possible in scope; and
(4) Writing the theory
The analyst can go back and forth between the
stages as more data are collected and analysed.
Our data sources comprise (a) literature on global
governance of nanotechnology (e.g. scholarly articles
published in the journal Nanoethics since 2007,1 policy
1 http://link.springer.com/journal/11569.
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and stakeholder discussions reviewed in Malsch 2011;
Malsch et al. 2012), (b) Interviewwith stakeholders from
the regulatory, industrial and insurance sectorswithin the
context of nanosafety projects like EU FP7 SUN and
SANOWORK, and (c) transcript of a workshop con-
ducted in the frame of SUN project on the potential role
of decision support in the international governance of
nanotechnology. These data sources are replete with
evidence that scholars and policy makers interested in
responsible nanotechnology development have intro-
duced and tested numerousconcepts and tools for putting
such global governance of nanotechnology and other
emerging technologies into practice. Along with pro-
viding sources to triangulate during grounded theory
development (Patton 1999), these data sources highlight
the relevance of international nanotechnology gover-
nance theories.
Our analysis is structured as follows. The section
‘‘Theoretical concepts on global governance of
nanotechnology engaging multiple stakeholders’’
considers some theoretical concepts relevant to the
global governance of nanotechnology, and how
these concepts relate to the current global gover-
nance of nanotechnology. ‘‘Role of Decision Sup-
port in Global Multi-Stakeholder Governance of
Nanotechnology during Norm Creation’’ section
outlines the potential role of decision support in
the global governance of nanotechnology. ‘‘Ground-
ed theory for international governance of nanoma-
terials’’ section integrates these discussions to the
notion of international governance of nanotech-
nology based on the grounded theory.
Theoretical concepts on global governance
of nanotechnology engaging multiple stakeholders
The issue of the participation of different state and non-
state actors in global governance has been the topic of
lengthy scholarly debates in different fields including
sociological and political studies of international rela-
tions as well as political philosophy and ethics. Some
relevant concepts and models are discussed below.
Sociological and political scientific aspects
of global governance of nanotechnology
Who are the actors involved in international gover-
nance in addition to states? Risse’s (2002) review of
transnational actors and world politics analyses the
state of knowledge on the question when and under
which conditions trans-national Actors (TNA) or
networks matter in international governance in addi-
tion to states and international organisations. He
distinguishes (non-governmental) advocacy networks
diffusing norms (International Non-Governmental
Organisations) and epistemic communities (Haas
1992) diffusing causal knowledge, as well as multi-
national companies (c.f. Hanekamp and Wu¨tscher
2007).
Haas (1992) defined ‘epistemic communities’
as…’’ network[s] of professionals with recognised
expertise and competence in a particular domain and
an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge
within that domain or issue area. Although epistemic
communities may consist of professionals from a
variety of disciplines and backgrounds, they have the
following:
(1) A shared set of normative and principled
beliefs, which provides a value-based rationale
for the social action of community members
(2) Shared causal beliefs, which are derived from
their analysis of practices leading or contribut-
ing to a central set of problems in their domain
and which then serve as the basis for elucidating
the multiple linkages between possible policy
actions and desired outcomes
(3) Shared notions of validity—that is intersubjec-
tive, internally defined criteria for weighing and
validating knowledge in the domain of their
expertise
(4) A common policy enterprise—that is a set of
common practices associated with a set of
problems to which their professional compe-
tence is directed presumably out of the convic-
tion that human welfare will be enhanced as a
consequence’’.
The major dynamics of epistemic policy coordina-
tion are uncertainty, interpretation and institution-
alisation (Haas 1992, p. 3). Concepts like epistemic
communities and epistemic cultures (Knorr-Cetina
1999) have been widely used in social studies of
science. Davis Cross (2013) criticises the restrictive
application of the concept in subsequent literature,
limited to single case studies and groups consisting
only of scientists. She advocates a more flexible
interpretation of the concept, improving its utility for
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understanding how knowledge translates into power in
international relations.
Especially, the concept of epistemic communities
as defined by Haas reveals relevant dynamics in the
case of international governance of emerging tech-
nologies as these technologies introduce uncertain
risks to the agenda of international policy making
the interpretation of which calls for scientific
expertise and that may lead to new institutionalisa-
tion of international governance regimes (c.f. IRGC
2006). Klaessig (2014) applies this concept to
critically analyse international discussions develop-
ing official practices for nanoEHS (Environment,
Health and Safety aspects). This is characterised by
uncertainty not only about risks of nanomaterials
and widespread differences in interpretations of
definitions but also about suitable methodologies
and interpretation of results of scientific experiments
among scientists and policy makers. Klaessig raises
issues about the current process of institutionalisa-
tion of what he calls ‘‘official science’’ replacing
normal science, because this mixes scientific quality
standards with political considerations and excludes
some results of scientific experiments on arbitrary
grounds.
What role do these actors play? Studies have
demonstrated that transnational actors including epis-
temic communities and advocacy networks can have a
substantial impact on state policies, on the creation of
international norms and on the diffusion of these
norms into domestic practices. It is unclear why and
under which conditions, due to the lack of case studies
of failed campaigns, according to Risse (2002). Risse
et al. (1999) argues that international institutions
provide arena’s in which the activities of transnational
actors are allowed to flourish, including the EU,World
Bank and UN World Conferences. Following Risse
(2002) three phases can be distinguished in the
international policy cycle (Fig. 1):
– Agenda setting, where the influence of transna-
tional actors has always been the greatest. In the
case of the risk governance of nanomaterials, this
is demonstrated by the Canadian-based interna-
tional NGO ETC group (Erosion, Technologies
and Control). This is certainly responsible for
setting the agenda for the debate on risk gover-
nance. Already in 2003 it pointed to the potential
environmental and safety risks of ‘‘Green Goo’’
and converging technologies and called for a
moratorium and a precautionary approach (ETC
Group 2003a, b, c, d, e, f, 2004). Their call was
picked up by UK Prince Charles and motivated the
Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering
study on nanotechnology in the UK (Dowling
2004) as well as a wide range of studies on ethical
and societal aspects of nanotechnologies, EHS
aspects of nanomaterials and public and stake-
holder dialogue initiatives worldwide (reviewed in
Malsch 2011).
– International norm creation, dominated by na-
tional governments and international organisa-
tions. Risk governance of nanomaterials is
currently in this stage of international norm
creation. Roughly in the period 2003–2012,
nanotechnology was probably the first research
area where broad and public stakeholder dialogue
on such international norm creation was ex-
perimented with, engaging epistemic communi-
ties, multinational companies and their
associations as well as international NGOs and
trade unions. Currently, in addition to national
governments and international organisations, such
engagement of transnational actors is mainly
restricted to epistemic communities and multina-
tional companies, typically behind closed doors,
in inter-, trans- and national standardisation
bodies and other expert committees (reviewed in
Malsch et al. 2012).
– Norm implementation, in which evidence suggests
that transnational actors and epistemic
Internaonal Governance: 
• Agenda Seng 








Fig. 1 The actors involved in international governance follow-
ing Risse (2002)
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communities assume centre stage. The legalisation
process legitimises their positions and they assume
a monitoring role International Organisations who
have to remain neutral cannot perform. It is too
early to say what role transnational actors will
eventually play in the implementation of the
nanosafety norms. This is because the legislative
framework for nanomaterials is still under devel-
opment, and may theoretically still result in a new
‘‘Lex Specialis’’ for handling the chemical identity
of these materials on the market, in the words of a
policy maker. However, the main trend in the
international norm creation dialogue on nanoma-
terials appears to aim at incorporating nanomate-
rials in current legislation in four phases:
occupational health and safety, chemicals, con-
sumer products and environment. The consumer
products are covered by product specific legisla-
tion for cosmetics, food, pharmaceuticals and
medical devices, biocides etc. (Malsch et al.
2015). Transnational actors could therefore con-
tinue to play the same roles in implementation of
the existing legislation in each phase, provided
they are made aware of the specific properties of
nanomaterials.
Ethics and political philosophy aspects of global
governance of nanotechnology
According to Risse (2002), the main unresolved
issues in the literature on transnational actors are
‘‘How can global governance by increasingly com-
plex tripartite networks solve the dual problem of
ensuring ‘input legitimacy’ of those concerned by the
legislation and ‘output legitimacy’ through effective
and enhanced problem solving? Closer examination
of the discussions on responsible governance of
nanotechnology (e.g. Malsch 2011) reveals a third
unresolved issue: ‘‘how to govern the emerging
technology responsibly during the period of interna-
tional norm creation?’’ Despite the fact that this is
only a temporary issue, it is not trivial: The issue of
uncertain risks of nanomaterials has entered the
international agenda in 2003, but insiders expect final
agreement on common norms to take another
5–10 years. During the 20 years in between, more
and more products incorporating nanomaterials are
entering the market. And this is only one example of
the continuous stream of emerging technologies. The
following sub-sections advance theoretical arguments
on the issue of input legitimacy and output legitima-
cy of global governance of technologies, moving on
to consider the issue of global governance during
norm creation. The role of the insurance sector in the
international norm creation phase is considered as an
example of the role played by this stakeholder in
international norm creation.
Input legitimacy: democratising decision making to all
stakeholders
The issue of input legitimacy is the focus of the so-
called ‘democratic deficit debate’. Rawls (1971,
1999), Habermas (1996, 1998) and others have
proposed deliberative democracy as a solution.2
Rawls’ approach to deliberative democracy is a
non-linear, co-constructive approach to decision mak-
ing. It is based on deliberative democracy and the
participation model of pure procedural justice.3 Rawls
does not agree with acting on the basis of calculated
probabilities (risk assessment). He says we have to add
on the condition that substantial values are at stake in
the choices we make when there is the risk of suffering
harm or loss depending on the decision taken. Rawls’
approach to deliberative democracy is founded on four
key commitments.4
Rawls’ theory of Justice on which his approach to
deliberative democracy is grounded is founded on
2 The relevance of Rawls’ Theory of Justice for responsible
governance of nanotechnology at global level is discussed in
Malsch (2011).
3 The participation model of procedural justice holds that
procedural fairness requires that those affected by a decision
have the option to participate in the process by which the
decision is made. There is a deep, constitutive connection
between participatory process, correct outcomes and distribu-
tive justice.
4 1. A belief in deliberation with decisions reflecting public
regarding reasons. 2. A true commitment to citizenship and wide
spread participation by the public. 3. A commitment to the idea
of agreement as a tool for regulation/governance—that is,
agreement among equal citizens through deliberation concern-
ing public regarding reasons as opposed to conclusions which
note the different perspectives of disagreeable people. 4.
Political equality which prohibits disparities in influence by
different social groups.
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‘‘justice as fairness’’.5 ‘‘It defines the conditions under
which the spontaneous coherence of the aims and
wants of individuals is neither coerced nor contrived
but expresses a proper harmony consistent with the
ideal good’’ (Rawls 1971). The principles which
emerge from the original position apply to the basic
structure of society hence the approach can be
developed as a legitimate input to strengthen collec-
tive decision making about the assignment of rights
and duties; to develop norms in the context of the
distribution of social and economic advantages in
different types of situations and to contribute to multi-
stakeholder global governance.
The ‘‘original position’’ is individualistic from
which evolved ‘‘Political Liberalism’’ (Rawls 1996)
which accepts the ‘‘fact of reasonable pluralism’’, the
fact that a diversity of reasonable yet conflicting and
irreconcilable religious, philosophical or moral doc-
trines can be affirmed by citizens in the free exercise of
their capacity for a conception of the good. Persons are
assumed to have two moral powers—a capacity for a
sense of justice and for a conception of the good.
Rawls argues that citizens in a constitutional democ-
racy who hold opposing even irreconcilable concep-
tions of the good can find a shared basis of reasonable
agreement through an ‘‘overlapping consensus’’ on the
basis that citizens possess virtues of tolerance, readi-
ness to meet others half way, reasonableness and
principles of fairness. Their comprehensive doctrines
are generally not fully comprehensive in so far as they
will develop an allegiance to the concepts that help to
bring about consensus.
The aim is to develop a criterion of justice that
would be agreed upon by all under conditions that are
fair to all; which could be used to assess the fairness of
the institutions of society, to structure moral discus-
sions while recognising the plurality of incompatible
and irreconcilable moral frameworks in a democratic
society and to justify the outcome of those discussions.
Habermas (2011) takes a more utopian ideal as a
starting point for his philosophical analysis than the
practical issue of ensuring input legitimacy. In an
essay on Kant’s idea of perpetual peace, Habermas
(2011, pp. 21–62) explains that Kant (1795) intro-
duced the concept of the law governing global
citizenship in addition to constitutional and interna-
tional public law. According to Kant, the persons
obeying the law must also be co-legislators, not only
within a particular state, but also at global level. Kant
expects that this will result in peace. Habermas sees
conceptual problems in Kant’s ideal, and notes that it
is incompatible with our historical experiences, but
this discussion goes beyond the scope of the present
article. It suffices to note that his analysis of Kant’s
ideas inspires Habermas (2011, pp. 176–195)6 to
sketch a global three layered system of national,
transnational and international government with two
legitimisation channels (Fig. 2):
(1) From global citizens through the international
community to peace and human rights politics
of the global organisation
(2) From state citizens via their national states and
possibly the appropriate regional regime to the
transnational negotiation system, that carries
responsibility in the framework of the interna-
tional community for world internal political
issues
(3) Both channels meet in the General Assembly of
the global organisation, that is responsible for
the interpretation and further development of
the political constitution of the global society
and therefore for the normative parameters of
both peace and human rights politics as well as
world-internal politics (Habermas 2011).
At global level, the central forum for the current
international norm creation on nanomaterials, an
example of a world internal political issue, is arguably
theOrganisation for EconomicCooperation andDevel-
opment OECD where the working party on
5 1. The maximisation of liberty ( here liberty refers to the right
to participate in deliberation) subject only to such constraints as
are essential for the protection of liberty itself; 2. Equality of the
basic liberties of social life and the distribution of social goods,
subject only to the exception that inequalities may be permitted
if they if they produce the greatest possible benefit for those least
well off in a given scheme of inequality - ‘‘the difference
principle’’ ( for our purposes equality places all stakeholders on
an equal footing via their representative); 3. Fair equality of
opportunity and the elimination of all inequalities of opportunity
based on birth or wealth.
6 In ‘‘the constitutionalisation of the international law and the
problems of legitimation of the constitutional global society’’).
215 Page 6 of 19 J Nanopart Res (2015) 17:215
123
manufactured nanomaterials is preparing decision
making by the Council of Ambassadors of OECD
Member States.7 ‘‘Recent decisions relevant to nano-
materials are the OECD Council Recommendation on
Nanomaterials of September 2013, which is not legally
binding. The OECD Council Decision on MAD
(Mutual Acceptance of Data) is legally binding for
chemicals in general. The aim of the regulatory
discussions at OECD level is to clear the way for
nanomaterials to become part of this international
system of legally binding agreements on the exchange
of safety data’’ (Malsch et al. 2015). Several UN bodies
coordinate their discussions on nanomaterials through
the Inter-Organisation Programme for the Sound Man-
agement of Chemicals (IOMC).8 Nanotechnologies
and manufactured nanomaterials are among the IOMC
and the strategic approach to international chemicals
management (SAICM)9 Emerging Policy Issues. The
IOMC participating organisations OECD and the
United Nations Institute for Training and Research
(UNITAR) are taking care of this issue. UNITAR
focuses on training and capacity building of govern-
ments in developing countries and has published a pilot
‘‘Guidance for Developing a National Nanotechnology
Policy and Programme’’ in 2011.10
This three layered system constitutes an institution-
alised solution to the input-legitimacy problem
formulated by Risse as it grants citizens a formal role
participating in democratic decision making at all three
levels. From Habermas’ perspective the deliberations
in the IOMC, SAICM, OECD, UNITAR, and other
participating international organisations and represen-
tatives of states would fit in the second legitimisation
channel. What is missing is transparency of these
deliberations to citizens of the participating countries.
The endpoint of this international norm creation
process should ideally be democratic co-decision
making at the level of the UN General Assembly and
an as yet non-existing global parliament of elected
representatives of all world citizens. At transnational
level in the European Union, the European Parliament
and the Council of Ministers of Member States are
already co-responsible for adopting or revising most
European regulations and directives. Therefore the
democratic deficit is less pressing at this level, hence the
focus of this article is at the global level.
What remains to be clarified is what role transna-
tional actors including advocacy networks, epistemic
communities and multinational companies should
play in this proposed system. Are they undesirable
aberrations of the current imperfect structure of
international relations, or can they be transformed
into efficient and democratic representatives of global
citizens? In addition, the issue of output-legitimacy
remains unresolved in Habermas’ system.
Output legitimacy: advancing shared global goals?
Indicators for output-legitimacy of such an interna-
tional governance system are effective and enhanced
problem solving. Kant (1795) formulated the ideal of a
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Fig. 2 Combining global and national citizenship following
Habermas (2011)
7 There are also bilateral dialogue platforms including most
notably the EU-US Communities of Research in Nano-EHS:
http://us-eu.org/. Such bilateral platforms also play a role in
negotiating an international consensus, but do not have the au-
thority to impose international norms, as is the case with the
OECD Council of Ambassadors for OECD Member States.
8 IOMC participants are Food and Agriculture Organization of
the United Nations (FAO), International Labour Organization
(ILO), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP),
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), United
Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), United
Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), World
Health Organization (WHO), World Bank and Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Info: http://
www.who.int/iomc/en/.
9 The SAICM is a policy framework adopted by the Interna-
tional Conference of Chemicals Management (ICCM) in 2006
for ensuring that, by 2020, ‘‘chemicals are produced and used in
ways that minimse significant adverse impacts on the environ-
ment and human health’’ (Johannesburg World Summit on
Sustainable Development, 2002). SAICM’s secretariat is hosted
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global republic where global citizens constitute global
law that imposes restrictions to the internal and
external sovereignty of states. Kant introduced a
pragmatic intermediary step in the form of a non-
binding voluntary league of nations of republics that
gradually expands itself. Habermas asserts that the UN
and EU already are communities of states and citizens:
the UN through its responsibility to protect interna-
tional security of states and human rights of citizens,
and the EU by its constitution. The problem is not the
lack of a constitution, but the lack of means of
enforcement (Habermas 2011). In this enforcement
endeavour, transnational actors may again be granted a
formal role, like the one they currently informally play
in monitoring national implementation of internation-
al norms (Risse 2002). For nanomaterials, it is
currently too early to see what role the interested
transnational actors may fulfil after agreement on such
norms will have been reached.
Governance of nanotechnology during international
norm creation
Currently more pressing for nanomaterials is the third
unresolved issue: ‘‘how to govern the emerging
technology responsibly during the period of interna-
tional norm creation?’’ Emerging technologies intro-
duce uncertainty into the global governance regime
because they may or may not be covered by the
existing body of positive law. International gover-
nance mechanisms are adapted to reducing this
uncertainty, formulating and adopting adequate legal
instruments. The issue of short- to medium term
solutions for governing uncertain risks of emerging
technologies is at the core of the contemporary
international dialogue on governance of nanomateri-
als. Several solutions have been proposed and imple-
mented over the last decade, but consensus on a
common solution is still lacking (e.g. Malsch 2013).
If the law turns out not to be the right medium for
solving this short term issue in international gover-
nance, would ethics or morals be able to play a
subsidiary role? Scherer et al. (2007) discuss what they
call the ‘‘republican business ethics model’’ advocat-
ing a supplementary function of ethics within the
framework of positive law. Business ethics is com-
plementary to positive law where its rules fail to
resolve emerging problems of business. They refer
among others to Habermas’ (1996, 1998) political
philosophy: The citizen and the corporation have
double roles as private citizens and as citizens of the
state or a community. The ISO international standard
26,000 for social responsibility of business and
organisations (ISO 2010) is an example of such
complementary business ethics.
Differences in political philosophies between the
participants in the international dialogue on emerging
technologies also influence their ability to consider
ethical in addition to legal norms as governance
instruments. A liberal perspective (e.g. Rawls 1971,
1999) tends to emphasise legal rights for citizens who
have handed over responsibility for law making and
law enforcement to the sovereign state they are in a
social contractual relationship with. A communitarian
perspective (e.g. MacIntyre 1981; Michael 1982;
Walzer 1983; Taylor 1985) tends to emphasise moral
rights and obligations engaging all citizens in a
common responsibility for human rights, society and
the environment.
Habermas argues that communitarianism is based
on the assumption that individual or subjective rights
are innate. ‘‘The alternative between ‘individualists’
and ‘collectivists’ disappears when one adopts the
unity of individuation and specialisation processes as
fundamental legal principles. Because legal persons
can also merely develop themselves as individuals
through the process of socialisation, the integrity of
the individual person can only be protected by
simultaneously guaranteeing free access to the inter-
personal relations and cultural traditions within which
they can maintain their identity. A well-understood
individualism remains incomplete without this addi-
tion of communitarianism’’ (Habermas 2011, p. 76).
Malsch (2011, 2013, forthcoming) discusses how a
communitarian perspective may shed new light on the
dynamics in and dialogue about ethical and societal
aspects of nanotechnology. This perspective allows
for observing as well as legitimising the roles played
by non-state actors in national and international
governance of emerging technologies. Communi-
tarianism does not offer tools for differentiating
different types of non-state actors. Risse’s discussion
of the roles of transnational actors distinguishing
advocacy networks or International Non-Governmen-
tal Organisations (INGO), epistemic communities and
Multinational Companies (MNC) does facilitate such
tools for describing the dynamics of international
governance of emerging technologies. Habermas’
215 Page 8 of 19 J Nanopart Res (2015) 17:215
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discussion of the ideal organisation of global and
national citizenship offers tools for investigating the
normative, prescriptive side of the issue.
As an intermezzo in these top-down theoretical
considerations the next section takes a bottom-up
perspective on governance during international norm
creation by zooming in on the role played by the
insurance sector as an intermediary between regula-
tors, industry and other stakeholders.
Nanotechnology sustainability
from the perspective of insurability
Concerns surrounding the health risks of engineered
nanomaterials from public interest groups, the lack of
suitable regulation, an environment of legal uncer-
tainty driven by ever changing legal definitions of
injury or even ‘‘nanomaterial’’, and the lack of
specifically tailored insurance products targeted at
the occupational or consumer risks from nanotech-
nologies are putting the industry’s long-term eco-
nomic viability at risk. There is interdependence
between risk perceptions, regulation, the legal profes-
sion and insurability; in this emerging and fast
changing space, regulators are failing to keep pace
and hence risk perception among the above stake-
holder groups remains a stubborn problem. In the
absence of well-developed regulatory protocols, the
insurance industry has for example come to occupy a
key role as an effective lobby in terms of improved
occupational risk management practice. The failure of
regulators and prominent industry participants to
create uniform standards for nanomaterials creates
an environment of uncertainty for all stakeholders.
The latter not only causes problems in term of risk
transfer but may lead to ill-conceived regulatory
requirements, potentially exhausting resources and
stifling innovation in the sector. In the absence of
targeted regulation and standards, the insurance
industry will continue to do what it has always done:
It will insure uncertain risks based on risk appetite and
a careful consideration of worst case scenarios,
although in the short term this will likely entail high
insurance premiums, reflecting the cost of uncertainty.
In this regard insurers effectively act as proxy
regulators and beacons of assurance to those indi-
viduals and groups who share concerns about the
human and environmental threats they perceive com-
ing from emerging technologies.
Figure 3 illustrates how key centres of civic
influence and decision-making can mutually effect
and benefit one another through multiple self-rein-
forcing feedback loops. For example, this can happen
through the sharing of risk information and proposals
for standard operating procedures (SOPs) etc.
It can be argued that insurers play a crucial role in
defining and shaping these relationships. For example,
the provision of insurance acts as a proxy regulator for
official regulators by signalling that the insurability of
risks renders them manageable and therefore amen-
able to regulation. This would tend to have positive
impacts on public perception that would only be of
benefit to insurers. For example, insurers involved in
litigation are sometimes at the mercy of juries whose
members’ opinions reflect the prevailing views of the
wider public in relation to perceived risks. Generally
speaking, the effects that insurers set in motion are
such that they eventually reinforce and support the
positions they have taken, although there are excep-
tions, for instance, insurers’ long history with asbestos
litigation.
Role of decision support in global multi-
stakeholder governance of nanotechnology
during norm creation
As the theoretical analysis indicates, international
governance of emerging technologies is a process in
which a variety of transnational actors participate in
cooperation with states and international organisa-
tions. This realm is increasingly being institution-
alised and norms are being created and revised to
accommodate technological progress and other con-
textual changes. Though proposals for improving
input and output legitimacy as well as governance
during the norm creation phase have been made and
are being experimented with, the system is still far
from perfect. Among the problems are a lack of
transparency of decision making processes for not
directly involved citizens and a lack of access to
validated state of the art knowledge for individual
decision makers. One of the envisaged solutions is
introducing software decision support into this
international multi-stakeholder governance of
nanomaterials.
This is of course not the first time such a tool is
considered in supporting international norm creation.
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Cash et al. (2003) reviewed a large number of cases
where science and technology have been mobilised for
sustainability, linking knowledge to action. This is a
different but overlapping problem statement from the
central issue of international norm creation in the
present paper. The main difference is that Habermas
(explicitly) and Risse (implicitly) aim to contribute to
solving the democratic deficit in the legislative process
at international level, while Cash and others cited below
take a more technocratic point of view and concentrate
on how expertise can be fed into decision making.
The main issue Cash et al. perceive is organising
boundary management between experts, policy mak-
ers and stakeholders, requiring a trade-off between
salience (relevance to the policy making process),
(scientific) credibility and legitimacy (to all stake-
holders) of the knowledge. This calls for boundary
management involving communication, translation
and mediation in some form of institution that may
utilise a ‘‘boundary object’’ such as co-development of
a model or scenario by representatives of all three
groups. The review reveals some unresolved issues:
(a) The demand side should be articulated better.
(b) The local, national and international level
should be bridged.
(c) The existing models are valid for non-com-
petitive sectors where existing knowledge
should be translated into action.
(d) It is not clear how the private sector may be
integrated in a public–private partnership (Cash
et al. 2003).
These are key aspects in the case of international
norm creation for nanomaterials. Despite several years
of stakeholder and policy dialogue, it is not always
clear which decision maker needs what kind of data.
Governance initiatives are taken at national, transna-
tional (EU) and global level, but not very well
coordinated, according to some interviewed industri-
alists and regulators (Malsch et al. 2015). Companies
manufacturing or handling nanomaterials operate in
competitive markets which calls for confidentiality of
some crucial information required by policy makers.
Considerable data gaps exist and there is no consensus
on what constitutes good data quality. The UK
Voluntary Reporting Scheme for engineered nanos-
cale materials (2006–2008) demonstrates that engag-
ing industry in a voluntary public–private partnership
for norm creation on nanomaterials is complicated. In
2 years, only thirteen submissions were received.11
The mandatory French declaration of nanomaterials
on the market introduced in 2012 was considerably
more successful. They received 10,417 declarations in
2014 and 3409 in 2013, but this required prior
adoption of a formal law.12
The Risk Governance framework developed and
applied to nanotechnology by the International Risk
Governance Council and the Dutch Health Council
(Renn 2004; IRGC 2005, 2006; Health Council of the
Netherlands 2006) distinguishes four categories of risk
(simple, complex, uncertain and ambiguous), calling
for increasing expert and stakeholder engagement.
Natural nanostructured materials are classified as
simple risks, and can be managed by agency staff
and external experts. Engineered nanomaterials are
classified as complex risks, for which the additional
engagement of (unspecified) stakeholders is required.
Active nanostructures and systems are classified as
uncertain risks, calling for the additional engagement
of industry and directly affected stakeholder groups.
Large and molecular nanosystems are classified as
ambiguous risks, calling for the additional engage-
ment of the general public. The authors do not appear
to have consulted stakeholders about their interest in
engagement with each of the types of risk governance.
Suggested methods for expert and stakeholder
Fig. 3 Relationships among key centres of civic influence and
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engagement do not include software tools or computer
models.
Since 2006, the wiki-website Toxipedia13 attempts
to bring together expert knowledge and stakeholder
views on chemicals by inviting certified experts and
interested lay persons to contribute different types of
articles to an edited site. The information on nan-
otechnology is very limited and qualitative, restricting
its usefulness for international norm creation. In the
USA, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
has published several case studies applying Compre-
hensive Environmental Assessment to (sometimes
remote) multidisciplinary expert and stakeholder en-
gagement in decision making on the organisation’s
nanomaterials research priorities: ‘‘Through struc-
tured decision-support methods stakeholders reach a
collective judgment about priority areas of research to
inform future risk assessment and management efforts
for the nanomaterial of focus in a case study
document’’.14
The EU funded SUN project15 is currently devel-
oping a software decision support tool targeting
nanomaterials, taking solicitation of stakeholder needs
for decision support as starting point in the design
process. This addresses Cash et al.’s first unresolved
issue. We describe some of the features of this tool
(currently under construction) and a thought ex-
periment of a potential data-rich wiki-tool that are
relevant for a decision support tool for better coordi-
nated international governance of sustainable nan-
otechnology, addressing the other three issues.
SUNDS tool design
Ongoing development of the SUNDS tool has given us
an insight into some features of a tool that is suitable
for international governance of nanotechnologies.
SUNDS has been developed through a three-stage
user elicitation process that involved potential users
from industry, regulatory and insurance sectors from
early stages of tool design (Malsch et al. 2014, 2015,
the user workshop on 21 October 2014), which have
played a significant role in defining the capabilities
and features of the tool. The SUNDS is tailored to the
European REACH regulation, which is considered to
be the most comprehensive regulation balancing
environmental risk and commerce of chemicals used
in industry, and contains common elements with
regulations of other countries such as various US
regulations applying to engineered nanomaterials and
nano-enabled products. SUNDS utilises multi criteria
decision analysis (MCDA), which gives it two impor-
tant capabilities for the governance of nanotech-
nology: (a) Technical criteria and stakeholder values
can be integrated to support decision making about
safety and sustainability of nanotechnology, (b)Uncer-
tainty estimation techniques can be used to charac-
terise the knowledge and data gaps associated with
various criteria, and (c) Sensitivity analysis can
identify the technical criteria and user values that
affect the decision model the most (Subramanian et al.
2014, 2015). Thus, not only can scientific evidence
and stakeholder values be integrated in norm creation,
but users also have the choice to apply the precau-
tionary principle to decisions concerned with the safe
production, handling and disposal of nanomaterials.
Further, uncertainty estimation and sensitivity analy-
sis results can potentially contribute to reformulation
of the framework and also serve as means for learning
within the epistemic community.
SUNDS is based on a two-tiered framework with
different complexities of tools and data requirements
to cater to diverse users and different levels of data
availability. Tier 1 is composed of the LICARA
NanoSCAN, a deterministic tool developed specifical-
ly for small and medium enterprises (SME). The tool
performs a semi-quantitative benefit-risk evaluation of
nano-enabled products over their life-cycle and has
low data requirements. Specifically, the model looks at
environmental, social and economic benefits vs.
ecological, occupational and consumer risks. Tier 2
of SUNDS includes the same components as Tier 1,
but manifests a higher level of complexity and
certainly has significantly higher data requirements.
It comprises two modules: (a) risk control (RC)
module, and (b) socioeconomic assessment (SEA)
module. The RC module integrates quantitative eco-
logical and human health risk assessment tools and
facilitates users to select technological alternatives
and risk management measures to reduce risks based
on efficiency of mitigation, technological maturity and
cost. The SEA module will compare the monetised
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conventional alternatives. The SUNDS tool aims to
evaluate the benefits and the risks of nano-enabled
products along their life cycle. International gover-
nance of nanotechnology encompasses higher levels
of social organisation and different governance con-
cerns that can be addressed by further expanding the
SUNDS tool.
Option: a wiki-tool for global governance
of nanotechnology?
As part of the stakeholder needs solicitation for the
abovementioned tool, a roundtable was organised on
‘‘Computer guidance and decision making for safe and
sustainable nanomaterials’’.16 As a thought ex-
periment, commentator Alfred Nordmann suggested
introducing a wiki-like system supporting public
collective decision making. In his view, this could
address the problem that currently there is too much
and too little information about risks of nanomaterials.
So many factors are relevant. Human decision makers
can’t take them all into account. The tool could
function as a sort of extension or prosthesis of the
mind. An individual decision maker can’t really think
through all the relevant aspects and needs a machine to
assist him or her. This is a form of e-science or
simulation that is commonly used for processing
information, but here also for supporting decision
making. Howwould this tool work: if it is open access,
people will be able to toggle the parameters and
include their own weighing. They should be able to
tamper with all the different elements of risk. The tool
could help politicise science: use the tool to make a
more democratic decision making on risk manage-
ment (Nordmann, personal communication).
The interviews on stakeholder needs for the
abovementioned tool design also addressed a similar
potential role in international governance: ‘‘According
to some interviewed policy makers, they are not likely
to use software decision support tools in preparing
political decisions on regulating nanomaterials, espe-
cially not in the short term. According to other
stakeholders, policy makers could benefit from tools
that indicate whether they should take action on
adapting regulation, or that support international
harmonisation of nanomaterials regulations’’ (Malsch
et al. 2015).
This article explores the implications and feasibility
of Nordmann’s suggestion for a potential role in
democratising international governance of nanomate-
rials taking into account the views of industry,
regulators, insurance company representatives and
risk assessment specialists present in the user work-
shop on 21 October 2014.
Supporting access to the governance arena
for transnational actor networks
Following Risse (2002), three overlapping types of
transnational actors are already active in the interna-
tional nanomaterials governance arena in addition to
regulators from states and international organisations:
epistemic communities, multinational companies and
advocacy networks. As a thought experiment, how
could each of these actors make use of a wiki-tool and
what role could such a tool have in democratising the
norm creation process?
Epistemic communities
The major dynamics of epistemic policy coordination
are uncertainty, interpretation and institutionalisation
(Haas 1992, p. 3). In the case of nanomaterials, a
professional epistemic community has formed con-
sisting of researchers from traditional risk assessment
disciplines (c.f. Klaessig 2014) whose common policy
enterprise is reducing uncertainty about risks of
engineered nanomaterials in order to facilitate adap-
tation or creation of international chemical norms. He
also reveals the existence of differences in interpre-
tation of scientific results and even of what constitutes
good science, and institutionalisation of an ‘‘official
science’’ epistemic community with its common
policy enterprise aiming to regulate nanomaterials at
the expense of normal science in Europe and the
OECD.
The current uncertainty in governance of nanoma-
terials is even broader than Klaessig envisages,
extending to the selection of relevant scientific
disciplines. Most often, this includes expertise on
‘‘Exposure through the Life Cycle, with Material
Characterization, Ecotoxicity Testing and Predictive
Models, with Material Characterization, Predictive
Modelling for Human Health, with Material
16 During the S.NET 6th Annual Meeting ‘‘Better Technologies
with No Regrets?’’—21–24 September 2014, Karlsruhe Ger-
many, www.itas.kit.edu/snet2014.
215 Page 12 of 19 J Nanopart Res (2015) 17:215
123
Characterization, Databases and Ontologies, Risk
Assessment and Risk Management and Control’’17 or
similar environment, health and safety and life cycle
assessment topics. In some cases more areas of
research are taken into account including economic,
ethical, legal and social aspects, but the uncertainty of
what constitutes salient, credible and legitimate data
from those areas is even bigger than for the more
traditional disciplines. In addition, many published
results are qualitative and therefore hard to integrate in
a computer model.
Notwithstanding these practical issues, the pro-
posed wiki-tool should collect data resulting from
studies in a variety of scientific disciplines including
environment, economic and social aspects. The people
who are expected to insert facts are therefore experts
from these different disciplines who can be considered
members of this emerging epistemic community. The
design of the tool could influence which experts are
considered members of the epistemic community of
sustainable nanomaterials. The most restrictive option
would be to ask the prospective user for professional
credentials before deciding which kind of input he or
she can insert: data and values or only values.18 This
presupposes that the manager of the tool has decided
beforehand which areas of research are relevant and
which are not. A suggestion made by the stakeholders
whose views have been solicited is to introduce quality
control on the data before allowing any user to insert
new data resulting from scientific studies. Thereby
‘‘official science’’ is distinguished from other normal
science that also has been subject to peer review and
hence is expected to correspond to commonly agreed
scientific quality standards. The most open option
would be to allow anyone to insert and correct data he
or she considers relevant, relying on the self-correct-
ing ability of the emerging epistemic community
without predetermining what is to be considered valid
data and who is considered to be a member.
The discussions during the stakeholder workshop
reveal a different structure of the emerging epistemic
community interested in international risk governance
of nanomaterials: the participation of industrial re-
searchers in addition to academics from universities
and public research organisations. The contribution of
industrial researchers is essential for data on emissions
and production volumes not available to academics.
Intermediaries such as companies marketing nanoma-
terials can contribute such data, provided solutions are
found to protecting proprietary data and sharing the
costs of testing.
Intermediaries, associations and consortia or net-
works are commonly used to generate data for norm
creation in a cooperative effort. Incentives may be:
– That profitable membership requires submission
of data
– Support offered by the intermediary (e.g. ex-
change) or association in data collection, coop-
eration in subsidised research consortia
– Reduction in insurance premiums—insurers
would be interested in a system that reflect the
emergence of risks that would call for increases in
insurance premiums
– Public image of the (large) company
(sustainability)
– Communication with clients and partners in value
chain (SMEs)
– Improving its own product
– Training by researchers and consultants how to use
the tools
Barriers to participation of MNCs in the epistemic
community include:
– Industrial users may require protection of propri-
etary data costing a lot of money
– Industry wants to avoid giving away expensive
data to competitors—need accommodation for
sharing this
– Nobody wants to take the lead in opening up the
information
– Design and data requirements of SMEs and
researchers clash
– Industrial users may lack the skills to use the
tools
MNC overlap with epistemic communities, because
they employ risk assessment specialist carrying out
tests of nanomaterials in the company’s R&D and
manufacturing. They are encouraged by policy makers
to share these test results with the international
community to facilitate the legislative process. A
17 The current US-EU Communities of Research Groups




18 The Toxipedia platform uses such a selection procedure.
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bottleneck hampering such contributions is the need
for protection of proprietary data and to ensure that the
costs are shared by all competitors and no one is given
a free ride. Is it possible to address this issue specific to
public–private partnership during the norm creation
phase by smart design of the wiki-tool or is a formal
legislative framework a prerequisite?
(Multinational) companies
A variety of companies participates or contributes to
the value chain from nanomaterials R&D and produc-
tion all the way to the waste processing stage of
products incorporating nanomaterials. This includes
large (multinational) companies as well as SMEs,
service providers such as instrument manufacturers,
banks and insurance companies and industrial asso-
ciations. As discussed above some of those companies
actively engage in dialogue on international norm
creation, either directly (mostly associations and large
companies) or indirectly through participating in
working groups organised by associations (see also
Malsch et al. 2015).
On the other hand, the companies are also stake-
holders with interests they want to be taken into
account by legislators. The discussions in the work-
shop reveal distinct subgroups with different interests,
priorities and requirements for the tool. In particular,
SMEs require tools that are user friendly and require
little investment of time and researchers. Lack of
knowledge on nanosafety inhibits innovation in large
industry applying nanomaterials. Companies market-
ing nanomaterials have an interest in establishing their
commercial value. Inside companies, workers and
employers have overlapping but different interests in
risk management of nanomaterials. Workers have a
direct interest in protecting their own safety.
The envisaged wiki-tool would be a MCDA based
Decision Support Tool that not only models the causal
relationships between input data and output criteria
that should be taken into account in decision making,
but also foresees the introduction of weights reflecting
different stakeholder groups preferences on more or
less important criteria. These weights could be intro-
duced in several ways. One way is by elicitation of
average weights of the different user groups of the
tools (e.g. industry as foreseen primary users), and
fixing these weights in the system. Another way would
be to include these average weights as default values in
the tool, but allowing users to insert their own weights
and compare those with the average of their own and
other stakeholder groups. The second option would
enhance transparency of how different values and
preferences may influence international norm creation
on nanomaterials.
Insurance companies
As argued in the section on nanotech sustainability
from insurability, insurance companies play the role of
proxy regulators during the international norm cre-
ation phase. The discussions during the workshop
suggest that they need data to support insurance
decisions (including estimates of uncertainty) such as
occupational health and safety and catastrophic events
(e.g. large scale occupational disease that manifests
itself after 20 years or so). They currently seldom
make use of decision support tools or computer
models in supporting their decision making on insur-
ance policies. One insurance company represented in
the user workshop has used PraediCAT,19 an analysis
of nanomaterials citations in 250medical journals, and
is continuing discussions on how this tool can be used
effectively. This suggests that there may be interest in
similar tools. In the proposed wiki-tool, insurance
companies could be interested to insert their weights
and compare them with the averages of their own and
other stakeholders in order to support their insurance
strategy.
Regulators
On the regulatory side, national, transnational (e.g.
EU) and international policy makers (e.g. OECD)
participate in international norm creation, including
representatives of states as well as the European
Parliament. Authorities participate in norm imple-
mentation. During norm creation, regulators are
interested in a category approach enabling read across
to drive risk assessment outcomes for risk prioritisa-
tion and identification of testing needs. They would be
interested in a system that reflect the emergence of
risks that would call for new regulation. (based on
discussions in the workshop and Malsch et al. 2015).
19 www.praedicat.com.
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The preferences or weights of different criteria of
these regulators as well as of authorities overseeing
norm implementation will be inserted in the system or
may be inserted by regulatory users as in the case of
company representatives.
Advocacy networks
Relevant advocacy networks tend to focus on a single
legislative phase. In dialogue on international gover-
nance of nanomaterials and nanotechnologies, trade
unions and their European and international asso-
ciations, environmental groups and networks, con-
sumers and patients associations, animal rights
activists and other interest groups have been par-
ticipating since around 2003. In many cases these
groups have cooperated with academics including
social scientists, philosophers and risk assessment
specialists because of lacking technical expertise in
the organisation. A prime example is the EU funded
project NanoCAP (2006–2009), where research
groups trained civil society organisations enabling
them to formulate positions and participate in the
dialogue on governance of nanomaterials and
nanotechnologies.20
The stakeholder needs elicitation in this SUN
project has not covered advocacy networks. An
interviewed regulator is interested in a tool ‘‘that can
make it easier for NGOs and watchdogs to monitor
compliance of companies to the norms during (the
future phase of) implementation.’’
Other studies may suggest how a wiki-type soft-
ware decision support tool could enable advocacy
networks to contribute to the current norm creation
and whether there would be any interest in such
contributions from their side. For example, Invernizzi
(2012) cites a trade union representative who com-
plained that they had difficulties negotiating about
nanotechnology regulation because the discussion was
limited to technical aspects, and that they had diffi-
culties hiring technical experts. Malsch (2013) reports
on interviews with several stakeholders including civil
society representatives about their need for education
and training in nanotechnology. Most of them were
only working on nanotechnology issue part of their
time for a limited period, and were interested in
learning about ‘‘nanoscience, nanomaterials, nanorisk
assessment, and legal and social aspects of nanotech-
nology’’ in general and in ‘‘specific aspects of
nanotechnology that enter their agenda for a short
time, and then shift focus to other topics that may not
be related to nanotechnology. Examples include
graphene, nanoparticles in waste, etc.’’ Preferred
teaching methods include: ‘‘specific courses, confer-
ences, or projects for the staff, training on the job/
learning by doing, and networking/asking experts
inside/outside the organisation’’ (Malsch 2013). Com-
puter models or software decision support tools were
not part of that study nor were they mentioned
spontaneously.
Supporting global citizenship
Returning to Habermas’ vision on a dual national and
global citizenship for all, calls for discussion of
another type of actor that has so far been excluded
from the analysis in this article: the elected represen-
tatives of citizens. Some initiatives and dialogue
projects on nanotechnology have attempted to foster
direct democracy (projects have been reviewed in
Malsch et al. 2012). However, Habermas presupposes
the model of a representative national democracy and
expands this to the trans- and international level.
Could the proposed wiki-tool support decision making
on new or adapted international norms at the level of
the UN General Assembly or any future Global
Parliament? The history of national and European
Parliamentary Technology Assessment organisations
demonstrates the complexity of raising the awareness
of politicians to issues related to emerging technolo-
gies and of offering them salient, credible and
legitimate information in time for adoption of legis-
lation.21 Whether politicians would be interested in a
software decision support tool has not been investi-
gated, but interviewed policy making preparing
political decisions do not consider such tools appro-
priate (Malsch et al. 2015).
20 www.nanocap.eu (accessed 12-02-2015).
21 The first was the Office of Technology Assessment in the
United States, which has been closed years ago. Currently the
US Government Accountability Office GAO is an associate
member of the European Parliamentary Technology Assessment
(EPTA) network. At the European Parliament and several
national parliaments such offices are still operational. C.f. http://
www.eptanetwork.org/.
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In a direct democracy scenario on the other hand,
the envisaged wiki-tool could offer any interested
individual with internet access the opportunity to
understand the criteria and values taken into account in
international norm creation on nanomaterials, but also
to influence the values underlying this process by
inserting his or her own values in the weights of the
tool. Though there would still be distinct roles for
experts contributing scientifically validated data and
lay persons, the latter would be able to influence the
values attributed to different criteria taken into
account in norm creation.
Grounded theory for international governance
of nanomaterials
Risse’s discussion of the role of transnational actors in
international norm creation inspires a search heuristic
to discover the potential roles of epistemic communi-
ties, multinational companies, advocacy networks and
states and international organisations in international
governance of nanomaterials potentially aided
through decision support tools. Constant comparison
with discussions during a stakeholder workshop and
literature reveal that these communities are internally
structured and consist of different kinds of actors with
distinct roles and interests, and that the main
categories overlap, with dual roles for individual
researchers and professionals as well as organisations.
Figure 4 aims to capture this internal structure of the
transnational actor networks and their relationships
with states and international (governmental) organisa-
tions in international governance of nanomaterials.
Overlaps between epistemic communities and multi-
national companies take the form of industrial experts
contributing to the generation and collection of data
for risk management and sustainable manufacturing of
nanomaterials, either directly as employees of their
company or mediated through companies specialising
in marketing of nanomaterials, industrial associations
or other networks. Overlaps between multinational
companies and states and international organisations
take the form of insurance companies acting as proxy
regulators. Overlaps between epistemic communities
and states and international organisations take the
form of researchers in public risk assessment research
centres with a role in the regulatory process. The
discussions during the stakeholder workshop revealed
an underlying conflict between governmental policy
makers and academic researchers that corroborates the
findings of Klaessig (2014). The selection of good
quality data can either be based on protocols pre-
scribed by the EU and OECD or on expert judgement.
The design of a decision support tool can offer an
arena for resolving this conflict by incorporating the
protocols as well as the option to insert changes based
on progress in the scientific state of the art.
The discussions during the workshop did not
involve representatives of advocacy networks, there-
fore these are set apart in this representation of
international governance of nanomaterials. Further
research is needed to reveal possible relations between
advocacy networks and other transnational actors.
Two stages of the international norm cycle pro-
posed by Risse (2002) play a role in the discussions
during the workshop: governance during norm cre-
ation and compliance during norm implementation.
These stages appear to be running in parallel: while the
dialogue on creation of new norms and the applica-
bility of existing norms is still ongoing, established or
recently adapted norms are already governing
nanomaterials.
During the norm creation phase, regulators are
under pressure to regulate nanomaterials in the
absence of the required relevant data. The precaution-
ary principle or a precautionary approach govern the
handling of nanomaterials. Governance during this
phase includes three aspects: a legal review of the
current regulatory framework, a ranking of policy
options and a series of interpretative norms that can be
used as quasi-directive as it can be used for risk










Fig. 4 Interrelationships of transnational actors, states and
international organisations in international governance of
nanomaterials
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Regulators are interested in support for decisions on
risk management of nanomaterials. MCDA may offer
opportunities according to some interdisciplinary
regulators, but is contested by others requiring hard
data as basis for decision making.
The fledgling nanomaterials producing industry is
called upon to engage in risk assessment supporting
the norm creation process, but this is not a traditional
role for industry. In addition, industry in general is
expected to use the tool in (non-mandatory) sustain-
able manufacturing to select less hazardous materials
early in R&D. Some large companies consider this in
their own self-interest, while most are not intrinsically
motivated for this. Intermediaries and insurance
companies are already collecting data from their
members that could be inserted in the tool and
contribute to supporting the creation of international
evidence based norms. They may offer support and
benefits to the companies. Industry could also be
pressed into using non-regulatory risk assessment
through threats of litigation on manufacturing as
developed in the USA. Suppliers and partners in the
value chain as well as industrial associations and
consortia can offer support or a platform for generat-
ing common data sets.
Most SMEs (and large industry) will not use a tool
unless it is compulsory, limiting its use to the norm
implementation phase. Regulatory compliance is very
important for them. The tool could be used to
demonstrate compliance with existing legislation
including REACH, cosmetics and biocides regulations
in Europe.
The discussions during the workshop suggest that in
the long term, a decision support system may
contribute to epistemic coordination through uncer-
tainty reduction (Haas 1992) by gradually replacing
defaults plus an uncertainty estimate with hard data.
The developers of the tool can incorporate data about
selected nanomaterials, but later users may insert data
on a broader range of (nano) materials. The design of
the wiki-tool must be open to such user input. Types of
data include: Risk and Environmental Impact Assess-
ment module (which in turn includes sub-modules on
ecological risk assessment, human health risk assess-
ment and environmental impact assessment), Eco-
nomic Assessment Module and Benefits Assessment
module. Data on hazards as well as exposure and
dose–effect models can be incorporated by the tool
designers. The tool design may incorporate absolute or
comparative assessment of technological alternatives
depending on data availability and user requirements.
Data on nanomaterial, risk management and produc-
tion volumes in the value chain could also be
incorporated later on by companies involved in
marketing nanomaterials. The costs of insurance could
be incorporated as an indicator of economic aspects by
later users of the tool.
Mixing values with data is problematic because of
legal and political reasons. It is important to clearly
separate them in the tool. Examples of values include
the following: The definition of nanomaterial imposed
by regulators determines the scope of what must be
tested. This is a political more than a science-based
decision. Data quality can be determined through
protocols imposed by regulators and scientific expert
judgement (combining values from different stake-
holder groups). The precautionary principle or ap-
proach is a core but controversial concept in
governance of nanomaterials, that should not be
incorporated in the tool design. Instead, uncertainties
should be made explicit allowing users to be as
precautionary as they wish. The level of acceptable
risk for the different endpoints can either be based on
current regulator preferences or on scientific expert
community judgement. The tool designers can insert a
fixed set of endpoints based on regulation and let the
scientific community define additional endpoints.
Which weights will be included for the different
endpoints as default and which options the user will
have is an open question.
Conclusions
Recall the first central research question: ‘‘What can
theories of international relations and deliberative
democracy contribute to understanding multistake-
holder governance of emerging technologies?’’
Risse (2002), Haas (1992) and others offer the
conceptual tools to understand the roles that are
currently played by epistemic communities (including
academic and private sector researchers from a variety
of disciplines), (multinational) companies playing
different roles in the value chain for nanomaterials
and advocacy networks targeting different phases in
the legislative framework in addition to states and
international organisations in this governance process
at international level. The workshop discussions
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reveal an internal structure of each of these categories
and overlap between them. Habermas, Rawls and
others offer the visionary institutional framework of
how anyone in a dual or even triple role of national,
(transnational) and global citizen could contribute to
international norm creation.
In response to the second central research question:
‘‘What role could software decision support play in
democratising such governance?’’, there appears to be
room for wiki-like software decision support tools in
the international governance of nanomaterials. This
three-stage process consists of past agenda setting,
current norm creation and current as well as future
norm implementation. A well-designed wiki-tool
could bring together test data and values from all
experts and stakeholders and increase the transparency
of the scientific data and values taken into account in
international norm creation. Now and in the future, the
tool could be used by all to demonstrate, verify and
monitor compliance with the norms.
Comparing the sketched international governance
context and the wiki-option with the current design of
the SUNDS tool highlights the following discussion
points for further consideration:
How can citizens be empowered in international
governance of nanomaterials (input legitimacy, output
legitimacy and governance during international norm
creation) through decision support?
What would be the optimal democratic and tech-
nically feasible option to ensure good data quality and
the protection of proprietary data while allowing
anyone to toggle with the weights?
Is it possible to allow users to insert their own
weights and compare them with the average of their
own peer group and other stakeholders?
Could the design be flexible enough to accommo-
date different emerging legislative frameworks (in-
cluding a new ‘‘Lex Specialis’’ as well as distinct legal
frameworks for each of the four phases in the
legislative cycle and for each type of consumer
product)?
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